Understanding the Supply Chain Risks in Windows Activation Tools

Introduction

Microsoft Activation Scripts (MAS) is a popular Windows and Office activation bypass tool used by over 1 million users globally. While functioning as intended today, its technical architecture presents significant supply chain attack opportunities that users should understand. This analysis examines the tool's functionality, persistence mechanisms, and potential weaponization vectors.

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Technical Overview: How MAS Works

Core Components

MAS is a 764KB batch script that implements multiple activation methods:

MAS_AIO.cmd
├── HWID Activation (Windows 10/11)
├── KMS38 (LTSC/Server editions)
├── Online KMS (Windows/Office)
├── Ohook (Office products)
└── TSforge (Extended Security Updates)

Execution Flow

1. Privilege Escalation: Requests administrator privileges via UAC
2. Environment Detection: Identifies system architecture (x86/x64/ARM)
3. Method Selection: Presents interactive menu for activation type
4. System Modification: Implements chosen activation method
5. Persistence Setup: Creates scheduled tasks and registry entries
6. Update Check: Connects to massgrave.dev for version updates

Activation Methods Deep Dive

HWID (Hardware ID) Method

Generates permanent activation through hardware fingerprinting:

# Creates GenuineTicket.xml with hardware identifiers
SessionId = [Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($env:SessionIdStr))
# Exploits ClipUp.exe vulnerability
clipup.exe -v -o
# Writes to ClipSVC directory
%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\ClipSVC\GenuineTicket\

Persistence Level: Permanent until hardware change

KMS38 Activation

Extends activation until year 2038:

• Installs Volume License Keys (GVLK)
• Modifies SYSTEM\WPA registry keys
• Patches Software Licensing Client calls
• Uses gatherosstate.exe for validation

Persistence Level: Valid until 2038

Online KMS

Emulates corporate licensing server:

# Sets dummy KMS server
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SoftwareProtectionPlatform" /v KeyManagementServiceName /t REG_SZ /d "10.0.0.10"
# Creates renewal tasks
schtasks /create /tn "R@1n-KMS" /tr "%SystemRoot%\system32\cmd.exe /c activation_script.cmd" /sc daily

Persistence Level: 180 days with auto-renewal

System Modifications and Artifacts

Registry Changes

MAS makes approximately 145 registry modifications:

• HKLM\SYSTEM\WPA
• HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SoftwareProtectionPlatform
• HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\sppsvc
• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\Licensing

File System Changes

%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\ClipSVC\GenuineTicket\
├── GenuineTicket.xml
└── GenuineTicket.xml.bak

%SystemRoot%\System32\
├── sppcs.dll (modified for Ohook)
└── sppc.dll (backup)

%SystemRoot%\Temp\
└── actids_159_* (temporary activation files)

Scheduled Tasks

<Task name="R@1n-KMS">
  <Triggers>
    <CalendarTrigger>
      <Repetition>
        <Interval>PT10M</Interval>
      </Repetition>
    </CalendarTrigger>
  </Triggers>
  <Actions>
    <Exec>
      <Command>%SystemRoot%\system32\cmd.exe</Command>
      <Arguments>/c activation_renewal.cmd</Arguments>
    </Exec>
  </Actions>
</Task>

Network Communications Analysis

Primary Endpoints

Update Mechanism Flow

graph LR
    A[MAS Script] -->|Check Version| B[massgrave.dev]
    B -->|New Version Available| C[Download Update]
    C -->|No Signature Verification| D[Execute with Admin Rights]
    D -->|Direct Execution| E[System Modification]

Critical Security Gap

The update mechanism lacks cryptographic verification:

# Current implementation (simplified)
$response = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://updatecheck.massgrave.dev/version"
if ($response.Content -gt $currentVersion) {
    # Downloads and executes without any signature check
    Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://massgrave.dev/update.cmd" -OutFile "update.cmd"
    Start-Process "update.cmd" -Verb RunAs
}

Supply Chain Attack Vectors

Vector 1: Infrastructure Acquisition

With over 1 million active users, the MAS infrastructure represents a valuable target for well-funded threat actors.

Potential Buyers:

• Nation-state APT groups
• Organized cybercrime syndicates
• Ransomware operators
• Cryptocurrency mining operations

Economic Analysis:

Vector 2: Malicious Insider Threat

The MAS project involves multiple contributors with varying levels of access to the codebase and infrastructure. A single compromised team member presents a critical risk.

How an Insider Could Become Compromised:

• Coercion: Nation-state pressure on developers in certain jurisdictions
• Financial Incentives: Offers too lucrative to refuse ($100K-500K)
• Account Compromise: Phishing or credential theft targeting maintainers
• Ideological Recruitment: Alignment with hacktivist or criminal groups
• Blackmail: Leveraging personal information against team members

Insider Access Capabilities:

Technical Implementation by Malicious Insider:

# Subtle backdoor hidden in "optimization update"
function Optimize-Performance {
    # Legitimate optimization code...
    
    # Malicious addition (obfuscated)
    if ((Get-Date).DayOfWeek -eq 'Friday') {
        $b = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String("base64_payload_here")
        $a = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($b)
        $a.GetType("Loader").GetMethod("Run").Invoke($null, @())
    }
    
    # More legitimate code...
}

Why This Vector Is Particularly Dangerous:

• Trust: Changes come from "trusted" team members
• Code Review: Malicious code can be obfuscated or split across commits
• Gradual Introduction: Backdoor components added over multiple updates
• Plausible Deniability: Insider can claim their account was compromised
• Direct Access: No need to purchase or hack infrastructure

Detection Opportunities

Network Indicators

DNS Queries:
  - updatecheck.massgrave.dev
  - cdn.massgrave.dev
  - activated.win
  
Traffic Patterns:
  - PowerShell User-Agent to non-Microsoft domains
  - HTTPS POST to licensing.mp.microsoft.com with anomalous SessionId
  - Periodic callbacks to massgrave.dev infrastructure

Host-Based Indicators

# Process chains to monitor
cmd.exe → powershell.exe (suspended) → net.exe → sc.exe
cmd.exe → wmic.exe → reg.exe (multiple instances)
services.exe → clipup.exe -v -o

# Registry keys of interest
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\WPA"
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SoftwareProtectionPlatform"

# Scheduled tasks
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.TaskName -like "*R@1n*" -or $_.TaskName -like "*KMS*"}

File System Artifacts

# Windows paths to check
%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\ClipSVC\GenuineTicket\*.xml
%SystemRoot%\Temp\actids_159_*
%SystemRoot%\System32\sppcs.dll (check modification date)

Risk Assessment Matrix

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Relevant techniques that could be leveraged:

Technical Recommendations

For Users Who Have Run MAS

1. Audit System Changes

   # Check for scheduled tasks
   schtasks /query /fo LIST | findstr "R@1n"
   
   # Review registry modifications
   reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\WPA" /s
   
   # List ClipSVC artifacts
   dir "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\ClipSVC" /s

2. Block Update Infrastructure

   # Add to hosts file
   127.0.0.1 massgrave.dev
   127.0.0.1 updatecheck.massgrave.dev
   127.0.0.1 activated.win

3. Monitor for Suspicious Activity
   • Unexpected network connections
   • New scheduled tasks
   • Performance degradation
   • Unusual PowerShell activity

For Security Professionals

1. Network Monitoring Rules

   alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 443 (msg:"Possible MAS Update Check"; content:"massgrave.dev"; http_header; sid:1000001;)

2. SIEM Detection Logic

   SELECT * FROM process_events 
   WHERE parent_process = 'cmd.exe' 
   AND process_name = 'powershell.exe'
   AND command_line LIKE '%-enc%'
   AND user_context = 'SYSTEM'

Understanding the Threat Landscape

Why Nation-States Might Be Interested

• Cyber Espionage: Access to 1+ million systems across various organizations
• Economic Warfare: Cryptocurrency mining or ransomware deployment
• Strategic Positioning: Sleeper botnet for future operations
• Plausible Deniability: Infections appear as user-initiated piracy tools

Corporate Implications

Organizations should consider:

• Any system running MAS has established persistence mechanisms
• Update channels remain active indefinitely
• Standard removal may not eliminate all modifications
• Full system reimage is the most reliable remediation

Conclusion

While MAS currently functions as advertised—a Windows activation bypass tool—its architecture creates substantial supply chain risk. The combination of:

• 1+ million active users
• Unverified update mechanism
• Administrative privilege requirement
• Persistent system modifications
• Established user trust

Creates an attractive target for well-funded threat actors. The $1 million investment required to acquire this infrastructure is trivial compared to the potential return from controlling over a million systems with administrative access.

The critical takeaway isn't that MAS is malicious today, but that its technical design makes weaponization trivial tomorrow. Users should understand that running such tools creates permanent security implications that extend far beyond simple software piracy concerns.